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1.  Introduction 
 
Agricultural support programs designed to protect farmers have undergone major reforms 
worldwide since the inception of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the mid 1980s.  The 
impetus for these reforms included the economic inefficiencies and budget costs generated by 
these programs, in addition to international pressures to minimize trade distortions.  United 
States major field crops policy has undergone significant changes since the 1985 Farm Bill were 
program yields were ‘frozen’, thereby starting the trend towards decoupling of the target price 
that was finalized in the 1996 FAIR Act.
1   Likewise in the European Union, partially decoupled 
programs for major agricultural sectors were implemented through supplementary direct income 
payments.  This program was initiated in the McSharry reforms of the early 1990s, and 
broadened in the EU’s Agenda 2000 of the recent Berlin Accord.  Canadian agricultural policy 
has also undergone major changes for a subset of the protected sectors, terminating several 
programs
2 and replacing them with direct income support payments through NISA. 
The effect of domestic subsidy programs on world trade has become an important policy 
issue, not least for the current agricultural trade negotiations.  In an unprecedented act, WTO 
disciplines on agricultural support include domestic programs that encourage production.  
‘amber’ and ‘green’ policy ‘boxes’ are used to differentiate those policies that seriously distort 
trade from those with minimal trade effects.  A key issue in the current WTO negotiations on 
agriculture will be the domestic support reduction commitments (measured by the “aggregate 
measure of support” or AMS) and the determination of which policies go in the ‘green’ versus 
‘amber’ or ‘blue’ box categories. Given the reform efforts of governments in agricultural policies 
                                                 
1 The loan rate remains fully coupled, however, through ‘loan deficiency payments’. 
2 For example, the Agricultural Stabilization Act (ASA), the Western Grain Stabilization Act (WGSA) and subsidies 
under the Western Grain Transportation Act (WGTA) have been terminated, and the National Tripartite 
Stabilization Program (NTSP) and the Gross Revenue Insurance Program (GRIP) are being phased out.   2 
for efficiency concerns and the ongoing trade negotiations, it has become increasingly important 
to understand the effect of farm programs on output response.  This is particularly true when the 
degree of decoupling has become murky.  Many policies involve transfers from consumers or 
taxpayer financed income payments that are partially decoupled like fixed payment yields, and 
payments based on both acreage planted and acreage diverted.  Previously, agricultural policies 
were rather straightforward and fully coupled with import barriers, open ended price supports or 
export subsidies.  The current trend is towards varying degrees of decoupled policies.  
The purpose of this paper is to identify the impacts of taxpayer and consumer financed 
infra-marginal production subsidies to farmers through the effects on fixed costs.
 3 In particular, 
income transfers to farmers like the peanut quota or base acreage and direct income payments for 
wheat can cover fixed costs, thereby allowing a farmer who may otherwise have exited the 
industry to stay in business, and perhaps even expand output beyond the quota or base acreage.
4   
In this light, we identify production related factors that impact the magnitude of necessary 
transfers and prioritize various means of subsidy finance, such as consumer financed subsidies 
via trade measures, or taxpayer financed subsidies via direct payments.  
To begin, we assume that these payments are fully de-coupled in the traditional sense.  
Taking the example of U.S. peanuts and wheat in Figure 1, point a is always to the right of point 
b in each panel of Figure 1. Hence, the effects of a consumer transfer policy on demand and 
consequently on trade distortion is straightforward from panel (a) of Figure 1.  Transfers are area 
c in panel (a) and areas c + d in panel (b).  Q is the peanut quota, T is the wheat target price, s is 
the per unit production subsidy for wheat, and B is the wheat base acreage.  The effects on 
production are indirect in that fixed costs are affected.  The exposure to world markets (i.e., the 
                                                 
3 “Infra-marginal” means the marginal cost for output receiving income payments is below the world price.   3 
ratio of exports to production), in addition to market parameters will determine the extent of 
output expansion.  The model explicitly recognizes several consequences of domestic support: 
(a) induce exit or entry; (b) bias production incentives in domestic markets; and (c) cross-
subsidize export in global markets.   
One can identify three broad categories of policies that encompass most “direct farm 
income payment schemes” in agriculture worldwide of infra-marginal income payments (e.g., 
ABC quotas for sugar in EU, peanut quota in the US and fluid milk quotas in California), an 
infra-marginal taxpayer financed income payment (former US crop policy with fixed payment 
yield and base acreage), infra-marginal direct income payment with a fixed per unit production 
subsidy s financed by taxpayers (e.g., EU oilseeds and cereals), and infra-marginal income 
payments financed by taxpayers but the income payments are fixed per farm (based on historical 
production) but farmers do not have to produce to get payments so (e.g., current U.S. production 
flexibility contract payments and emergency assistance payments). 
Our focus on this paper is to develop a generalized model of how payments can affect 
fixed costs so to further our understanding of the importance of domestic support programs on 
global competitiveness.  We use the U.S. peanut and wheat sectors as examples.  To this end, we 
develop a framework isolating factors affecting the competitiveness of agriculture in terms of 
two major categories of domestic farm support: direct payments (e.g., production flexibility 
payments for wheat) and consumer transfers with price supports (peanuts).  We therefore isolate 
the production response of income transfers depending on whether it is taxpayer or consumer 
financed.  Payments cover fixed costs, and thus affect producer responses ranging from outright 
market exit to cross-subsidizing (promoting) exports. By explicitly recognizing the presence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The approach also allows for the potential effect of decoupled payments on investment, given the specialized skills 
of farmers and imperfect labor, information and capital markets (Roberts, Skees).   4 
fixed costs, this paper brings to bear the effect of direct payments may have on strategic export 
policies in disguise.  In this context, the urgent issue facing policy makers is to prioritize policies 
as to their impact on exports.  Different types of domestic policies have differential effects on the 
level of farm income and production costs, thus affecting exit/entry and/or production beyond 
domestic use in cross-subsidizing exports. The value-added of this research paper is to provide a 
coherent framework that makes explicit the role of farm support in world trade, and to develop 
relevant criteria on how programs can be classified in order to improve the effectiveness of 
current domestic support policies. 
  The empirical framework will involve calibrating the production and cost structure of a 
typical farm type for the peanut and wheat sectors to illustrate the usefulness of the analysis and 
how outcomes depend on, inter alia, prices, demand, and cost variables specific to the industry 
in question.  Empirical simulations of the relevant criteria that link global trade competitiveness 
with domestic farm support will aid in understanding the relative effects of the various factors 
identified. 
2.  Background 
Direct government payments in the U.S. crop sector have peaked at $22.7 billion in 1999 
(see Table 1). Consumer financed infra-marginal production subsidies include peanut and sugar 
quotas in the United States and the European Union, respectively, and supply management 
programs in Canada can act like an export subsidy because of higher domestic prices imply a 
decrease in consumption and production expands because infra-marginal payments helps pay for 
fixed costs.
5  Consumer financed transfers are also high in the case of U.S. peanuts where 
domestic prices are over 50 percent higher than world prices (see Table 4).  It is possible for   5 
these direct income payments to affect output regardless if the farmer is required to produce the 
product in order to obtain the payment (like in peanuts) or not (as in wheat).
6  Tables 2 and 3 
give costs of production for wheat per farm (by farm size) and per acre, respectively.  Table 4 
presents the fixed cost breakdown for peanuts.  In the United States, fixed costs are higher than 
variable costs for peanuts and cotton.  The fixed costs for wheat are among the lowest of all 
crops in the United States relative to total costs. 
To motivate the effect of the income payment on output through its effect on fixed costs, 
consider a payment base B in Figure 2 for a small country exporter with payments equal to the 
sum of area a and b.  World prices are below the average total costs so this farmer would 
ordinarily exit the industry and produce nothing.  Total fixed costs are area b, c, d and e. Because 
point f < Pd, these fixed costs are covered if the farmer produces at B.  Otherwise, the farmer 
exits the industry.   If it is profitable to produce at point B, it is also profitable to produce at Q if 
and only if the world price Pw is greater than the minimum of the AVC curve.  Hence, there are 
three discrete production outcomes that can be affected with direct income payments: Q, B or O 
in Figure 2.  However, if the world price is above the minimum of the ATC curve, then income 
payments have no impact on output. 
Do such programs constitute “cross-subsidization”?  This is an important issue, given the 
many sectors with such programs in the United States, European Union and Canada, especially 
given the recent WTO Panel decision on Canadian dairy pricing.  The farmer maximizes total 
profits in one operation: producing a product for two markets.  There are three zero-one potential 
outcomes: exit (or do not enter), produce base only, or produce where the world price equals 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Consumer financed infra-marginal production subsidies are unique in that it involves price discrimination and so 
requires import controls and an additional trade distortion not applicable to taxpayer financed infra-marginal 
production subsidies.  This may have implications for trade law. 
6 We assume the right to income payments is freely tradable across farms.    6 
marginal cost and so export as well.  A necessary but not sufficient condition for exports to occur 
is for the world price to equal marginal costs between the minimums of the ATC and AVC 
curves.  Cross-subsidization requires profits from one operation to offset losses from another 
(required to lose money in an operation).  The question arises: why would a firm want to finance 
losses in one operation with profits from another operation?  
In Figure 3, a farmer is only able to produce at Q’ with Pw’ if net losses on total 
production given by the hatched area is less than excess rents to cover it, given by the cross-
hatched area.  Otherwise, he is unable to stay in business.  If he were rational, he would produce 
at B regardless.  If he stays at Q’ with Pw less than the minimum of the average variable costs of 
production, then he is irrational to sell for export (and if the hatched area is greater than the 
cross-hatched area, then he will be forced out of business and pay for his irrationality in not 
producing at B only and making a profit).  One reason perhaps why a firm may do this is the 
waiting game of having other firms exit the industry first and so prices will increase in the future.  
This is something like a predatory pricing strategy perhaps (although the farmer really is not a 
monopoly).  
Therefore, cross subsidization may be a problem for infra-marginal production subsidies 
where farmers also produce at the lower world price.  Farmers do have to decide to either 
produce for the domestic market only, for both markets, or exit the industry. 
A general methodology is developed to show the conditions under which a firm would 
choose each of the three options, the degree of distortion (relative size of B versus Q, the slope of 
MC, the level of fixed costs to total costs, the level of payments, etc.).  We then evaluate industry 
output in aggregate and analyze the distribution of cost structures and farm sizes to link 
conditions determined for an individual firm to aggregate industry output.    7 
3.  The Basic Model 
Production 
We envisage an economy in which a large number (N) of producers are engaged in the 
production of an output x.  Individual producers are endowed with production technologies: 
). ( x L G x =  G is taken to be strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in a composite 
variable input (Lx).  We assume that perfect competition prevails in factor and output markets, 
and producers take factor rewards w along with world price p, as exogenously given.  Define the 
cost function of an individual producer as: 
. ) ( . . , min ) , ( x L G t s F wL F x C x x Lx ‡ - =  
where F ] , [
+ - ˛ F F  is taken to be a firm specific fixed cost parameter. The distribution of the N 
firms in the range  ] , [
+ - F F  is given by a cumulative distribution function m(F), with  0 ) ( ' ‡ F m . 
Consumption  
Consumption demand of x in the economy is characterized by a demand function D(q), 
with  0 ) ( ' £ q D , where q denotes the price of good x facing consumers.  The link between 
domestic consumer price q and world price p depends on the commercial policy regime.  In 
particular, let q > p be a target domestic price to be received by domestic producers only, and 
D(q) be the associated domestic demand. 
Export Subsidies 
The two-stage profit maximization problem of an individual entrepreneur involves (I) the 
decision as to whether or not to incur the fixed cost F, and (II) the choice of an output level given 
the competitive market returns to factor inputs, along with domestic q and world price p.  We 
begin with the second stage problem.  Let the magnitude of coupled and decoupled income   8 
support be given by an ad valorem subsidy s and a lump sum subsidy M respectively.  Since q 
denotes unit revenue for  d x £ , the profit function is given by: 
) 2 ( ]. )) 1 ( [ ( ) , ( ) 1 ( max
) , ( ) )( 1 ( max
d s p q M F x C x s p
M F x C qd d x s p
x
x
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where q denotes the domestic target price.  Two observations are in order: First, infra-marginal 
consumer-financed subsidies in the context of producer preferences that exhibit risk neutrality is 
equivalent to a lump sum decoupled payment of the amount  d s p q ) 1 ( + - .  Second, denote 
) , (
* s p x  as the profit maximizing output level, and  d x d s p e - =
* * ) , , ( , it follows that the profit 
function can be written as: 
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Routine manipulation yields the standard price equals marginal cost condition: 
) 4 ( , 0 ) , ( ) 1 (
* * £ + - + F d e C e s p x  
with complementary slackness.  Specifically, the firm exports strictly positive amount (e^*> 0) 
of good x if and only if  . 0 ) , ( ) 1 (
* * > + - + F d e C e s p x  
Accounting for equation (3) above, an individual firm is better off incurring the fixed cost 
F if and only if: 
) 5 ( , ) , , , , , ( r p ‡ F M q d s p  
where r denotes the income available from the next best alternative for the entrepreneur.  Since 
the left hand side of equation (3) is strictly decreasing in F, define: 
} { ) 6 ( , ) , , , , , ( | ) , , , , , ( ˆ r p = = F M q d s p F F M q d s p F    9 
F ˆ thus represents the fixed cost required by the marginal entrepreneur, such that 
0 ) , , , , , ( ‡ F M q d s p p  if and only if  F F ˆ £ .  Note, in particular, that F ˆ is strictly decreasing 
in domestic input costs w, while an increase in world price p, and direct payment either coupled s 
or decoupled M widens the range of producers who commit to production by incurring the 
producer specific fixed cost F.  
Finally, F ˆ is strictly increasing in q, if and only if marginal revenue is strictly less than 
marginal cost when domestic q + (D(q)/ D’(q)) – Cx  0 £ .  The intuition of the latter result is 
straightforward.  Since an increase domestic price q requires a corresponding decrease domestic 
consumption, aggregate profit of the individual producer increases whenever the marginal 
revenue losses subsequent to output reduction is strictly less than the corresponding cost savings.  
Given the definition of F ˆ  above, the number of firms with positive output levels is given simply 
by  ). ˆ ( ˆ F N N m =  
3.1  Output, Export Volume and Welfare  
Equation (4) allows us to define aggregate export volume as: 
) 7 ( ), ˆ ( ) (
*
ˆ
* * F Ne F d e N E
F
F
m m = ” ￿
-
 
Let  ]) 1 , 0 [ (˛ f  parameterizes the excess burden of taxpayer financed subsidy payments 
(Moschini and Sckokai), so that  M M ) 1 ( f
f + ” and 
* ) 1 ( spx S f
f + ”  represent the per-
producer cost of financing decoupled and coupled payments.  Making use of equation (4) above, 




























































where  ( ) 0 ))]) ˆ ( ' )) ˆ ( ( /[ ) 1 ( ( 1
1 2 > + - + = W
-
F F N s p q m m .  Thus, although decoupled payments 
are relatively less distorting than coupled payments in terms of the output choices of individual 
producers (
f f S x M x ¶ ¶ < ¶ ¶
* * ), equation (9) above shows that decoupled payments are 
nevertheless relatively {\it more distorting} in terms of aggregate output since 
(
f f S F M F ¶ ¶ > ¶ ¶ ˆ ˆ ).  Figure 4 illustrates the intuition behind this result.  In particular, an 
increase in coupled subsidy rate increases the producer price from p to p(1 + s), with an 
associated increase in subsidy expenditure (assuming here that  0 = f ) that is given by the area 
A, B, C and D.  Nevertheless, area B and C represent the corresponding increase in producer 
profit only.  Simply put, area D is dissipated as output increases from x1 to x2 necessitates a 
corresponding increase in (marginal) production cost associated with the increase in output from 
p to p(1 + s).  Meanwhile, area A (> 0 whenever d > 0) represents a net transfer of government 
revenue to consumer surplus, as the wedge between consumer (q) and producer price p(1 + s) 
falls with s. 
In addition, denote aggregate output as  . ) ˆ (
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if the exit deterrence impact of decoupled payments (.) ' m  is sufficiently large -- an empirical 
matter depending on the actual distribution of fixed costs across firms.    11 
Likewise, since consumer surplus CS is given by  ￿
¥
=










In order words, a small reduction in consumer surplus renders possible a corresponding increase 
in domestic target price by the amount 1/D(q).  It follows, therefore, that the tradeoff between 
domestic consumer surplus losses, and the degree of output distortion on the part of individual 
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if and only if marginal revenue of the domestic demand curve evaluated at the target price q - q/ 
h is strictly less than (greater than) marginal cost Cx.  Indeed, aggregate output is strictly 
decreasing in CS, or equivalently, X
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It follows, therefore, that infra-marginal consumer financed subsidy payment is less output 
distorting than taxpayer financed subsidy payment if and only if the elasticity of domestic 
demand is sufficiently high, or if excess burden of taxpayer finance f is sufficiently small.    12 
Turning now to total producer surplus, let PS  be given by 
￿ - =
F
F F d F M q d s p N PS
ˆ













s x sp px
d x p
F N
s x sp px
d x p
F N



































) ˆ ( '
1
1
) ˆ ( ˆ
1






if the exit deterrence impact of decoupled payments  m’(.) is sufficiently large. 
Likewise, the tradeoff between domestic consumer surplus losses, and the producer 
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3.2  Calibration 
Let the following functional forms apply: 
G( x L ) =
a
x L  
D(p)  =  a - bp 
   13 
where a, b > 0 are demand parameters. In addition, let fixed cost be a normally distributed 
random variable.
7  It follows that the cost function is given by: 
C (x, F) = ax
1/a (w/a) + F. 
In addition, the profit maximizing total output and export levels, along with the profits of 
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As a benchmark, consider the case whereby the endogenous entry / exit decisions of 
producers are not accounted for, so that  N N ˆ =  throughout, output distortion due to the joint 
application of consumer-financed, coupled and decoupled payments is given simply by: 
a
a













* * ) 1 ) 1 (( )) 0 , ( ) , ( (
w
p s N p x s p x N     (15) 
Clearly, infra-marginal subsidy payments have no output consequences as x
* is 
independent of M and q. 
Turning now to the definition of the marginal producer, who is just indifferent between 
exit, or maintaining positive output levels, we have  
                                                 
7 As such, producer profits are also distributed according to a normal distribution.   14 
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Equations (12) - (13) thus constitute two equations in  N ˆ  and d that can be used to 
simultaneously determine the fixed cost level of the marginal producer, along with the output 
level upon which consumer-financed subsidy payments is made to each producer. 
Thus, aggregate output distortion due to the joint application of consumer-financed, 
coupled and decoupled payments can be readily decomposed into three components, with: 
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where the expressions in square brackets respectively denote output distortions that are due to 
coupled, consumer-financed, and taxpayer financed decoupled income payments, all of which 
can be computed once the following parameters are given: input share (a), input price (w), world 
and domestic consumer prices (p and q), along with the distribution of fixed costs across firms 
m(F), and consumption demand parameters a and b. 
In a similar fashion, aggregate export distortion depends on: 
[ ]
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4.  Calibration Results   
Section 3 lays the foundation for the calibration results summarized in tables 5 to 7, 
where the output, export and producer welfare consequences of U.S. wheat policy are examined. 
To begin with, the variable costs information in Table 2 is used in conjunction with the data on 
gross cash income to yield the variable cost share parameter a.  With LDP per bushel given by 
$0.19 per bushel in 1998, the implied market price of wheat is $2.39 per bushel.  These 
parameters, along with equation (12) above allow us to calibrate farm-level output levels in 
Table 5.  Specifically, in the absence of the possibility of exits, total output falls by 265.42 
million bushels  (10.42% reduction) in event of a removal of coupled LDP payments.  Thus, the 
implied elasticity of aggregate supply is 1.31.  In addition, making use of equation (13), removal 
of LDPs implies a reduction in aggregate exports from 1,505.6 to 1,041.7 million bushels – a 
30.81% reduction, at constant world market price ($2.39 per bushel) (Table 6).  
  The change in profits due to LDPs can also be computed using equation (14).  These 
results are presented in Table 7.  Note that for every sales class, LDP payment exceeds the 
increase in variable profits.  This is in consonance with our discussion in section 3 above, 
wherein deadweight losses (area D in Figure 4) are associated with coupled subsidy payments,  
so that a dollar increase in government expenditure on LDPs translates to less than one dollar 
increase in producer profits.  The computed total deadweight loss associated with coupled LDP 
payment in 1998 is $25.265 million.      
  Turning now to incorporate the possibility of exits, Table 6 provides the output and 
export responses to three policy regimes: (I) removal of LDP payments only  (II) removal of 
AMTA only and (III) removal of both AMTA and LDP.  Since we are limited by the level of 
data disaggregation in our data set, we limit the group of farms that are most vulnerable to exit to   16 
farms with sales less than $50,000 – the only group of farms with negative computed profits 
(Table 6).  As in Section 3.2, we assume that farm profits are distributed according to a normal 
distribution. The projected numbers of farms with negative profits in Table 7 are thus determined 
once the mean and the standard deviation of computed farm profits are computed.  
Recall from the discussion in equations (8) and (9) that whereas coupled subsidies are 
more output distorting in the absence of an exit option, decoupled subsidies are nevertheless 
more effective in deterring exit since the question of deadweight losses (other than the excess 
burden of financing direct income payments) does not arise.  The results provided in Table 6 are 
representative of these analytical results.  To begin with, note that by accounting for the 
possibility of exit by farms with negative projected profits upon removal of LDP payments 
(leaving the decoupled component of direct income payment intact), total output is 2171.81 
million bushels – an additional reduction of 110.7 million bushels (a total reduction of 375.5 
million bushels, or 14.74% of the 1998 benchmark).  This can be attributed to the aggregate 
output reduction if 11,368 farms (54.1%) in the $50,000 sales class abandon wheat production 
altogether.  Meanwhile, removal of AMTA payments implies negative profits for a strictly larger 
number of farm units (12,411 farms, 59.07%), while the implied aggregate output level due only 
to the removal of AMTA payments is 2396.84 million bushels – a reduction of 150.46 million 
bushels (5.9% of 1998 status-quo).  Thus, as long as existing farms continue to produce with 
coupled subsidies in place, the (coupled) subsidy-induced increase in output of the existing farms 
more than compensate for the negative output response as farms belonging to the smallest sales 
class exit the industry once AMTA payments are removed.  Finally, removing both AMTA and 
LDP payments triggers a reduction in total output that is equal to 390.25 million bushels (15.3% 
of 1998 benchmark).    17 
The degree of export cross-subsidization via direct income payments can also be 
ascertained when fixed costs and the potential exits of farms are duly taken into account.  Thus, 
at constant (1998) market price, the implied level of exports is 651.47 million bushels (as 
compared to 1505.6 million bushels in 1998)  – the smallest of all three potential policy 
scenarios under consideration when the possibility of exit is taken into account.  This is followed 
by the case whereby only LDP payments are removed (666.21 million bushels), and the case 
with AMTA payment removal (891.24 million bushels).  
5.  Conclusion 
This paper proposes an analytical framework based on the premise that fixed costs and 
the decision to exit impact aggregate production, and hence export consequences of direct 
income payments. In particular, even though decoupled payments do not affect production 
decisions at the margin (Collins and Vertrees), the exit deterrence effect of decoupled payments 
can potentially be more output distorting than coupled payments, once the deadweight losses 
associated with coupled payments are taken into account (section 3.1).  Meanwhile, to the extent 
that aggregate output depends on the decision to exit, direct income payment can cross-subsidize 
exports, and distort international trade flows depending on the distribution of fixed costs across 
individual farm units.  Attempts to evaluate the relative merits of decoupled and coupled 
payments based on their impact on aggregate trade flows and producer welfare should 
accordingly take into account the impact that both marginal and infra-marginal payments may 
have on aggregate output, and export levels. 
  In this exploratory study, we take wheat production in the U.S. as a case in point.  The 
calibration framework laid out in section 3.2 is employed to study the output and export 
consequences of three policy scenarios, having to do with the removal of LDP payments, AMTA   18 
payments, and both.  The results are broadly consistent with our analytical findings, in that 
whereas removal of decoupled payments can have a relatively large impact on the exit decision 
on low-profit farm units, its aggregate output impact can remain quite limited so long as the 
output level of the marginal farm is relatively small.  Clearly, these results are sensitive to the 
distribution of AMTA payments across farm size, along with the reservation profit of the 
marginal farm.  Thus, if reductions in decoupled payments are biased in such a way as to 
disproportionately favor low output farms, the exit deterrence consequence of direct income 
payments may imply a much smaller output and export distortion than suggested in this study.  
Meanwhile, if existing income payments generates expectation of future payments that 
compensates short-term losses, the reservation profit of the marginal farm may take on a 
negative value and the aggregate output and export distortion of decoupled payments can 
accordingly be considerably larger.  Also of interest seems to be the possibility of the interaction 
between risk-induced production distortion, and the way in which direct income payment 
impacts producers’ attitudes towards risk.  The resulting output and export distortion should 
therefore appropriately account for: (I) direct payments as a corrective policy in the face of risk 
aversion (Bhagwati); (II) the risk aversion impact of direct payment in the presence of non-
constant rate of risk aversion  (Hennessy; de Gorter and Tsur) and (III) the risk exposure effect 
of infra-marginal consumer financed export subsidies when barriers to trade also provide an 
income safety net for agricultural producers.  Much more work clearly remains to be done in this 
area.a 
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Table 1: Direct Government Payments (all major field crops in 
mil. $) 
     
             
  1997  1998  1999P  2000F     
             
Total Direct payments  8,070  12,225  22,704  17,190     
             
    AMTA  6,120  6,001  5,109  4,924     
   Loan Deficiency  na  1,792  6,874  7,866     
   CRP and other  1,950  1,623  1,989  1,966     
   Emergency Assistance  0  2,809  8,732  2,434     
             
P = preliminary,  F = forecast             
Source: Agricultural Income and Finance/AIS-73/December 1999       
  p(1+s ) 
 x 
D(q) 
 Figure 4 
C
x
      
         
x d
   A              B                 C      D  
Table 2: Fixed versus Variable Costs and Government Payments by Farm Size (sales class) for Wheat 






$100,000 to  $50,000 to  < 
$50,000 
        $249,999  $99,999   
             
# of farms  43,739  1,089  2,463  8,045  11,131  21,008 
Gross Cash Income  91,770  640,286  327,701  159,699  71,206  20,560 
   Government Payments  19,522  83,097  66,859  37,142  18,560  4,438 
   Average AMTA Payment  10,083  44,815  31,473  18,991  9,544  2,649 
   Average LDP Payment  4,111  *25,136  17,257  7,111  3,477  667 
Less: Cash Expenses  74,540  493,267  231,215  124,293  61,985  22,066 
Variable   53,154  369,791  163,819  86,942  45,105  15,145 
Fixed  21,386  124,476  67,396  37,350  16,880  6,922 
Equals: Net Cash Farm Income  17,230  147,018  96,487  35,406  9,220  -1,506 
Net Farm Income  15,752  72,799  77,330  36,592  12,047  -442 
*indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.       
            
Table 3: U.S. Wheat Policy             
  1998   1999          
             
Loan Rate  2.58   2.58          
Market Price  2.65   2.55          
Base Acres (Mil. acres)  78.9   79.1          
Cost of Production (mil. $)  11214.6   10551.5          
Cost of Production ($/acre)  170.4   168.0          
     Variable ($/acre)  67.6   62.3          
     Fixed Costs ($/acre)  102.8   105.6          
Acres Planted (Mil. acres)  65.8   62.8          
LDPs + MLGs (mil. $)  476.5   917.2          
LDPs + MLGs (mil. bushels)  1641.7   1971.1          
AMTA + emergency aid (mil. $)  2301   2966          
Payment Yield (bushels/acre)  34.5   34.5          
Production (mil. bushels)  2547.3   2302.4          
Exports (million bushels)  1041.7   1099.7          
             
Table 4: U.S. Peanut Policy             
  1998  1999         
             
National Quota (Mil. lbs)  2334.0  2360.0         
Production (Mil. lbs)  3963.4  3870.2         
Exports (Mil. lbs)  561.0  800 (forecast)       
Acres planted (1000 acres)  1521.0  1533.0         
Yield (lbs)  2702.0  2711.0         
Prices             
    Quota (cents/lb)  39.8  39.8         
    Average price (cents/lb)  28.0  25.6         
Gross Value of Production ($ 
Million) 
1125.9  991.8         
Total Costs ($/acre planted)  742.1  na         
     Operating Costs ($/acre planted)  328.7  na         
     Allocated Overhead ($/acre 
planted) 
413.4  na           24 
Table 5: Wheat Simulations 








$50,000 to  < $50,000 
      499,999  249,999  99,999   
             
# of farms  43,739  1,089  2,463  8,045  11,131  21,008 
Output (mil. Bu.)  2,547.30  517.42  441.18  929.57  405.58  251.94 
Output (Mil bu.  per farm)    0.4751  0.1791  0.1155  0.0364  0.012 
Computed output without LDP 
(Mil. bu) 
2,281.88  466.04  408.7  848.37  355.35  203.41 
Computed output without LDP (Mil. bu. per 
farm) 
0.428  0.1659  0.1055  0.0319  0.0097 
             
             
             
Table 6: Direct Income Payment and the Possibility 
of Exit 
       









  1998  LDP (no 
exit) 
LDP  AMTA  AMTA and LDP 
% of farms with negative profits  --  --  25.99  28.38  29.47   
# of farms with negative profits   --  --  11368  12411  12890   
Computed Output (Mil. bu)  2,547.30  2,281.88  2171.81  2396.84  2157.05   
% Reduction in Output    10.42  14.74  5.91  15.32   
Computed Exports (Mil. bu)  1,505.60  1,041.70  666.21  891.24  651.47   
% Reduction in Exports    30.81  55.75  40.80  56.73   
             
             
Table 7: The Costs of Direct Income 
Payment 
         








$50,000 to  < $50,000 
      499,999  249,999  99,999   
             
Computed LDP payment ($ per 
farm) 
--  90,275  34,033  21,954  6,923  2,279 
Computed profits without LDP 
and AMTA 
--  307,620  130,936  77,473  11,088  -827 
Computed profits without LDP  --  352,435  162,409  96,464  20,632  1,821 
Computed profits without AMTA  --  393,392  163,717  98,466  17,579  1,226 
Increase in variable profits with 
LDP ($ per farm) 
  --  32781  20993  6490  2054 
Deadweight loss ($ per farm)  --  4,503  1,252  961  433  225 
Deadweight loss ($)  -
25,265,211 
4903767  3083676  7731245  4819723  4726800   25 
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